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Abstract
This is a review of the book Quantum [Un]speakables: From
Bell to Quantum Information. Reinhold A. Bertlmann and Anton
Zeilinger (editors). xxii + 483 pp. Springer-Verlag, 2002. $89.95.
Ten years after his death, one of the sharpest minds in quantum physics
was celebrated in a memorial conference.
John Stewart Bell (1928-1990) was one of the leading physicists of the 20th
century, a deep and serious thinker. He worked at CERN in Geneva on the
physics of particle accelerators, made a number of impressive contributions to
quantum field theory, and became famous for the discovery of a phenomenon
he called nonlocality. However, the most remarkable thing about him was
perhaps that he was a realist.
Realism is the philosophical view that the world out there actually exists,
as opposed to the view that it is a mere hallucination. We are all born realists,
but some of us change our minds as adults. Now it may seem to you that for
physics to make any sense, a physicist would have to be, or at least pretend
to be, a realist; after all, it would seem that physics is about finding out how
the world out there works.
But, as a matter of fact, in the 1920s Niels Bohr, the leading quantum
physicist of his time, began to advocate the idea that realism is childish and
unscientific; he proposed instead what is now called the “Copenhagen inter-
pretation” of quantum physics, a rather incoherent philosophical doctrine,
which (according to Richard Feynman) “nobody really understands.” Part
of this doctrine is the view that macroscopic objects, such as chairs and
planets, do exist out there, but electrons and the other microscopic particles
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do not. Correspondingly, Copenhagen quantum theory refuses to provide
any consistent story about what happens to microscopic objects, and in-
stead prefers to make contradictory statements about them. According to
the Copenhagen view, the world is divided into two realms, macro and micro,
“classical” and “quantum,” logical and contradictory—or, as Bell put it in
one of his essays, into “speakable” and “unspeakable.”
Although it is not clear where the border between the two realms should
be, and how this duality could possibly be compatible with the fact that
chairs consist of electrons and other particles, Bohr’s view became the or-
thodoxy. That is, it became not merely the majority view among physicists,
but rather the dogma. Ever since, being a realist has been rather dangerous
for a quantum physicist, because it has been widely regarded as a sign of
being too stupid to understand orthodox quantum theory—which, as we’ve
mentioned, nobody really understands.
Along with Albert Einstein, Erwin Schro¨dinger, Louis de Broglie and
David Bohm, Bell was one of the few people who felt compelled by his con-
science to reject Bohr’s philosophy. Bell emphasized that the empirical facts
of quantum physics do not at all force us to renounce realism: There is a
realist theory that accounts for all of these facts in a most elegant way—
Bohmian mechanics (also known as de Broglie–Bohm theory). It describes a
world in which electrons, quarks and the like are point particles that move
in a manner dictated by the wave function. It should be taught to students,
Bell insisted, as a legitimate alternative to the orthodoxy. And in 1986, Gi-
anCarlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber succeeded in developing
a second kind of realist theory, encouraged by Bell and known as spontaneous
localization. But overcoming prejudice and changing convictions takes more
than one generation.
Quantum [Un]speakables is the proceedings volume of a conference held
at the University of Vienna in November 2000 to commemorate the 10th
anniversary of Bell’s death. The 30 articles written for this volume by 35
authors deal foremost with nonlocality and, of course, the meaning of quan-
tum theory. The contributions focus very much on personal recollections and
mostly presuppose that the reader is familiar with the relevant physics and
mathematics. The recollections make this book a valuable source both on
John Bell the man and on the history of quantum physics between 1950 and
1990. Among other things, several authors complain about the dogmatic
aversion among physicists in the 1960s to even take note of Bell’s nonlocality
theorem.
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Quantum [Un]speakables also reflects the prevailing situation in the year
2000 in that it collects personal, diverging views about the meaning of quan-
tum physics from a cross-section of physicist. The cross-section is biased,
though, because researchers working on Bohmian mechanics, of which Bell
was the leading proponent during the decades before his death, were simply
not invited to the conference, and the realists are in the minority among the
authors. Thus we recommend that readers be very cautious in regard to the
conclusions drawn in this book about the foundations of quantum physics.
This warning concerns in particular the conclusions drawn from Bell’s
nonlocality theorem. Let us tell the story briefly here. Bohmian mechan-
ics involves superluminal action-at-a-distance and thus violates the “locality
principle” of relativity theory. This was considered, by the Copenhagen
camp, an indication that Bohmian mechanics was on the wrong track. In
1964, Bell proved that any serious version of quantum theory (regardless of
whether or not it is based on microscopic realism) must violate locality. This
means that if nature is governed by the predictions of quantum theory, the
“locality principle” is simply wrong, and our world is nonlocal. It also means
that the nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics is not a sign of its being on the
wrong track, but quite the contrary.
The Copenhagen view, in comparison, is indeed less local: It is nonlocal
in cases that Bohmian mechanics can explain in a purely local way. (For
example, for a particle in a quantum state that is a superposition of being in
London and being in Tokyo, according to Copenhagenism there is no matter
of fact about whether the particle actually is in London or in Tokyo prior
to the first attempt at detection—which presupposes a temporal ordering.)
But it is also contradictory, vague and confusing enough for its adherents
to claim it is completely local, and thus that nonlocality is a consequence
of an attachment to realism. Therefore, so the argument goes, it was Bell
who finally proved realism wrong! Bell, of course, emphatically rejected this
incorrect interpretation of his nonlocality theorem.
The crucial experiments violating Bell’s inequality and thus, according to
Bell’s theoretical analysis, demonstrating nonlocality have been performed
many times since 1980, and have also lead to significant improvements in
experimental techniques. Some of these techniques have now become valuable
for quantum cryptography and the first steps towards the construction of
a quantum computer. These two fields are usually summarized under the
key word ”quantum information,” and great hopes are expressed, also in
Quantum [Un]speakables, that quantum information will provide new insights
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into the nature of the quantum world.
But we see no reason for such hopes. Quantum information theory is a
straightforward application of the rules laid down in, for example, John von
Neumann’s classic 1932 book on the mathematical foundations of quantum
mechanics. Any interpretation of quantum mechanics, to the extent that
it succeeds in explaining these rules, also explains quantum computers and
the like. And to the idea that quantum theory may after all be merely
about information and nothing else, Bell responded with a crucial question:
“Information? Whose information? Information about what?”
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